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PANEL INTRODUCTION
MODERATOR, NEIL J. KRITZ
SENIOR SCHOLAR ON THE RULE OF LAW, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE
The genocide of 1994 in Rwanda was overwhelming in its barbarity
and ferociousness. The rate of slaughter of its victims was three to four
times that of the number of Jews killed in the Holocaust. Additionally,
the populations and percentage of those populations killed are roughly
comparable to the genocides in Cambodia and Rwanda. In Cambodia,
however, they did their work over a four-year period. Virtually the
same degree of slaughter was perpetrated in Rwanda in a mere one
hundred days.
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"),
established by Security Council Resolution 955 in November of 1994,
has unfortunately received significantly less attention internationally
than its elder sister Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The
Yugoslavia Tribunal was described as one of the best kept secrets in
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the international legal community. If the Yugoslavia Tribunal was one
of the best kept secrets, then the Rwanda Tribunal clearly has
surpassed it. The attention given to the Rwanda Tribunal and the
Rwandan domestic process of justice tended to focus on the problems
that exist in these processes. Probably the greatest degree of attention
that the international press devoted to the Rwandan Tribunal concerned
the well-known report by the Inspector General of the United Nations
pointing to all the problems with the Tribunal. There are, however,
many positive things to recognize on both the international and
domestic scenes. A newly produced Inspector General's report, for
example, notes that of the twenty-six recommendations made a year
ago, twenty-two have made progress.
The Rwanda Tribunal arguably has turned the comer and now is
making significant progress. As noted last evening, of the thirty-five
individuals indicted, twenty-three are currently in custody. Unlike the
Yugoslavia Tribunal, this number includes many of the top officials
and principal organizers of the genocide. Moreover, new developments
in prosecution strategy have arisen and the Tribunal has set new legal
precedents. There is also a noticeable difference between the Security
Council resolutions establishing the Yugoslavian and Rwandan
Tribunals. Namely, the latter recognizes the importance of the
interplay between the international tribunal and the domestic scene.
Resolution 955 of the Rwanda Tribunal stresses the need for
international cooperation to strengthen the courts and judicial system
of Rwanda. In particular, it focuses on the necessity for those courts to
deal with large numbers of suspects. Moreover, it mandates that an
office be established and proceedings be conducted in Rwanda where
feasible and appropriate. The interplay of this Resolution will also be a
focus of our discussion this morning. We have with us today three
eminently qualified panelists to present these issues.
Our first panelist is the Honorable Navanethem Pillay. Judge Pillay
serves on the ICTR. In this capacity, she serves as a judge in Trial
Chamber One, which has just completed the closing arguments of the
first trial, the trial of Jean-Paul Akayesu. Further, since March of 1995,
Judge Pillay has acted as a judge on the Supreme Court of South
Africa. She also has a number of "firsts" to her credit. She is the first
black woman to start a law practice, which she accomplished in 1967.
She is the first South African to be awarded a doctorate in law by
1998] 1
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Harvard Law School. Over a twenty year period, Judge Pillay has
represented South African political prisoners, including detainees at
Robin Island and elsewhere. She has addressed pressing issues of
human rights and international law in a number of precedent setting
cases. She also has written and actively has worked on a variety of
issues, focusing in particular on the issue of women's rights.
Our second panelist is Bernard Muna. Mr. Muna serves as Deputy
Prosecutor for the ICTR. Previously, he served as a Magistrate and
Provincial Chief Prosecutor in his native Cameroon. He is also a past
president of, among others, the Cameroon Bar Association, the Central
African Lawyers Union, and the United African Association.
Additionally, Mr. Muna is a member of the International Senate of the
Union Internationale du Advocats and is the author of a number of
papers and publications, with particular emphasis on issues of human
rights and justice.
Our third panelist is Ambassador Theogene Rudasingwa, the
Ambassador of Rwanda to the United States. A physician by training,
Ambassador Rudasingwa has been obliged to give up or at least put on
hold that profession, as he has been called into leadership positions for
this country over the past several years. From 1991 to 1993, Dr.
Rudasingwa participated in a variety of peace initiatives, including the
Arusha talks. He also represented the Rwandan Patriotic Front at the
Organization of African Unity and, until very recently, served as the
Secretary General of the Rwandan Patriotic Front at the United
Nations. Dr. Rudasingwa is one of the important leaders and thinkers
in the continuing effort to put his country back together and build a
brighter future in the aftermath of 1994. I would also like to note that
he has a closer personal connection to Rwanda's process of justice than
one might expect from the average ambassador in Washington, since
he has a brother who serves as Secretary General of the Rwanda
Ministry of Justice.
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PRESENTATION BY THE HONORABLE
NAVANETHEM PILLAY
JUDGE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
INTRODUCTION
It is a great privilege to be here. I thank the Washington College of
Law and my host for inviting me. I was actually in the middle of the
next case, which involves Georges-Anderson Rutaganda when I
received my invitation to be a panelist. We expect to conclude that
second case by the end of 1998, but the presiding judge, Judge Kama,
and Judge Aspegren felt that this was a very important conference and
that it was necessary that I attend. So, we adjourned the trial for a few
days to enable me to attend. I would like to say that I formed a good
impression after looking at the reading material and I am very
impressed with the work done by the Washington College of Law. The
Washington College of Law has not only researched the Tribunal, but
is also up to date with the information of both the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"). This second
Tribunal tends to be forgotten by the North.
I. CONCURRENT JURISDICTION HELD BY ICTR AND LOCAL
RWANDAN COURTS
I am going to stay with the topic, which is the Rwanda Tribunal and
its relationship to national trials that are proceeding in Rwanda. These
trials are occurring simultaneously, so some of the issues relate to who
is being tried by the ICTR and who is being tried inside Rwanda. I
think it is fair to say that the prosecutor of the ICTR is focusing on
people we may designate as the most serious offenders-people who
were in authority, like national leaders, people in key political,
administrative, and military positions; people involved in planning;
and people involved in propaganda. Amongst the indicted persons are
the former Prime Minister-Jean Kambanda-the Minister of
Defense, the Minister of Transport, the Prefet, Burgemeister, and a
professor of history. There is one Belgian citizen and the rest are
Rwandan citizens. These are the people who are appearing before the
Tribunal in Rwanda.
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It is important to point out that while the two jurisdictions can hold
trials concurrently and have concurrent jurisdiction, the statute
mandates that the Tribunal has superseding jurisdiction. This provision
was followed when the Kingdom of Belgium applied for the
extradition of Colonel Bagosora. The government of Cameroon
arrested the colonel. The Kingdom of Belgium asked for his transfer
because they wished to investigate the death of ten Belgian soldiers
who were part of the UNAMIR forces. The Rwanda Government,
however, wanted to hold the actual trial of Colonel Bagosora in
Rwanda in order to have a visible demonstration of justice taking its
course inside the country. They felt that was very important to their
peace and reconciliation process. Colonel Bagosora has now been
transferred to our detention facilities.
We also hold the principle that if anybody has been tried and
acquitted by the Tribunal, a national court cannot try such person for
the same offense. This raises the question: How comfortable are we
then with concurrent trials before the Tribunal and the Rwandan
Government?
In terms of sheer volume, the contrast between the ICTR and the
national trials in Rwanda is striking. We have thirty-five indictments
and twenty-three accused persons in custody at our detention center in
Rwanda. This does not even compare with the 120,000 men, women,
and children who are in prisons inside Rwanda awaiting trial.
We completed the first case of Jean Paul Akayesu in the first week
of April, 1998. It was a very historical moment for us. We are about to
complete the prosecution case and then the defense case will start in
Rutaganda. The case of Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana is
being heard by Trial Chamber II.
11. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE ICTR AND ICTY
We added our second courtroom in October of last year. I would
like to point out that the Rwanda Tribunal was set up a year after the
ICTY. Yet, we seem to have outstripped them. Nobody, not even the
Ambassador David Scheffer, gives us credit for that. The Ambassador
even asked us to quicken our pace a bit. I will address this point about
expediting trials raised by the Ambassador in a few minutes.
I mention these factual details to illustrate that the statute was
promulgated in November 1994. The judges were elected in April
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1995 but were only put in office in September 1996. We lost almost
two years before we were allowed to begin our work. These were the
instructions from the United Nations.
In January 1997, we started the Akavesu trial. In actuality, I sit in a
number of chambers while we get on with these trials. I read that the
Registrar made a press statement in New York last week saying that in
1998, the judges are going to be working 600 days in the year. I do not
know how we are expected to do that, but there you are.
Certainly we have far greater resources than inside Rwanda and this
will affect the nature of the trials, including the extent of the legal
protection for the defendants inside Rwanda. For instance, in a nine
month period, ICTR paid the defense counsel in the Rwanda Tribunal
a total of $1 million. Resources such as this clearly affect the extent to
which witnesses can be summoned to testify, both for prosecution and
defense.
III. ISSUES REGARDING THE DEFENSE
A. Defendants are Held in Custody for Long Periods of Time
Unfortunately, in both the ICTR and Rwanda, there are defendants
in custody awaiting trial for extended periods of time. We have in our
custody people who have been in detention for periods of two years
and longer. I think inside Rwanda, they have been in custody from July
1994 until the present. This is a matter of great concern to all of us.
The ICTR statute says that defendants must be given fair and
expeditious trials. We have to balance this right to a fair trial with the
rights of the accused while at the same time trying to get on with the
trial as expeditiously as possible. In that respect, it is very much in the
hands of the prosecutor, who has the mammoth task of investigating
and bringing forward the evidence. There are also administrative
problems that are frustrating for a judge because we are outside the
administrative process and yet we are so affected by it, particularly in
the ICTR.
I think it is also important to note that the defense counsel has a fair
amount to say about this notion of expeditious trials. They have urged
us not to bow down to public pressure and to give them enough time.
Let me quote the lawyer named Monthe in the Akavesu case. He said
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that "you can't go too fast and you can't go too slow." Presumably, he
does not want it to move at all. Justice, in his view, "is an old lady and
you cannot shake old bones." He also said that public opinion should
not be let through the door because if you let public opinion in, justice
is going to fly out the window. According to Monta, public opinion is
like a prostitute; you make sure you keep her outside the door. I think
we should let everyone know that the judges want to let public opinion
in the door. Clearly, the defense's concern was that they should be
given sufficient time to prepare trials.
B. Sentencing Issues in Relation to Local Rwandan Courts
Inconsistency in sentencing is another problem that arises from the
existence of two concurrent jurisdictions. The ICTR follows the United
Nations' principled position against the death penalty. This means the
highest penalty we would pass would be life imprisonment. While I do
not think we should underestimate the impact of a life sentence, there
is a disparity of views with regard to the death penalty. The argument
is that the lesser offenders may well end up with the death penalty in
Rwanda, whereas the ICTR is trying serious offenders who can only
receive a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. I imagine this is
another concern of the Ambassador.
It is important to note that the government of Rwanda asked for this
Tribunal initially. But when it came to the final voting, they voted
against the establishment of this Tribunal because they wanted it to be
situated in Kigali where people could see justice being done. They also
were opposed to the one year subject matter jurisdiction. Furthermore,
the Rwandan government felt that the Tribunal was not independent
because we were sharing the chief prosecutor with the ICTY, and they
were appalled that there was no provision for the imposition of the
death penalty.
C. Jurisdictional Issues
No government has raised the question of jurisdiction before us,
although defense counsel did so in the case of Joseph Kanyabashi, in
which I participated. We gave a ruling on the challenge to the
jurisdiction. As you know, this Tribunal was established under Chapter
VII. Where the Security Council said there was a threat to international
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peace, the defense counsel argued that this was a political decision and
it overrode sovereignty.
This was the first time there was interference in the sovereign's right
to administer the judicial process. This is more problematic for us than
for ICTY, because in Rwanda there is an internal conflict. It is not an
international conflict. We ruled on this issue and took judicial notice of
the fact that because of the spillover of refugees and insurgents outside
Rwanda, there may well have been a situation of destabilizing
neighboring countries, thus constituting a threat to international peace.
The Tribunal charges individuals, however, not groups. When we
worked on our judgment, we were very concerned about this aspect of
individual responsibility. We were unsure how to approach the
situation where people failed to take action. Moreover, we can try
Rwandan citizens and non-Rwandan citizens who committed crimes
inside Rwanda. That explains the presence of the Belgian radio
journalist, Georges Ruggiu.
We have experienced strong cooperation from states in respect to
people who have been transferred to our jurisdiction. They came from
Zambia, Kenya, Cameroon, Belgium, the Ivory Coast, and
Switzerland. The only countries that have not transferred an indicted
person are Zaire and the United States. I believe that this is an on-
going process. It is very important that the United States is seen by the
rest of the world to be cooperating with the Tribunal in respect to the
handing over of indicted persons.
D. Rwandan Unrest Affects the ICTR
The other difficulty the Tribunal has faced is holding trials in the
middle of a conflict. The deputy prosecutor, Mr. Muna, will explain to
us more about the conflict situation in Rwanda and how this impacts
-witnesses and the prosecution's investigation. This problem is very
real for us. Apart from all the other logistical problems, we are located
in a rural mountainous area that is cut off from the rest of the world.
We have electrical power problems. The first thing I shopped for when
I landed were torches, because we need them to read when the power
goes off. I am also sad to say that there were two attempts at hijacking
the Tribunal's staff and two people were shot, but not fatally. There is
an ongoing conflict and a real risk to witnesses as well as a risk to
Tribunal staff.
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I think we should look to our practical experience when it comes to
formulating the International Criminal Court, which would institution-
alize the work of the ad hoc tribunals. One of the drawbacks at ICTR
is, for instance, the United Nations rule. Apparently, the United
Nations staff are not permitted to talk to the press. When you do not
give information to the press, even about your indictments, there is
very little information going out in respect to that subject. I would like
to see that rule changed.
IV. THE AKA YESU CASE
I would like to mention that in the Akayesu case there are two counts
of sexual violence and rape. The testimony is horrendous. Nothing in
my thirty year career in South Africa on torture, deaths, and detention
prepared me for this level of atrocities. We intend to deal with that in
our first judgment. I think this judgment will be historic because it is
going to deal with gender persecution and rape as a war crime.
We appear to be working very well in marrying the two systems of
civil and common law. I am sure that the common law system is as
strange to the civil judges and lawyers as the civil law system is to me.
When Akayesu gave his testimony, my colleagues on the bench said
that was their first time they have had an accused testify and be
subjected to cross-examination. They were intrigued that they could
question the accused. We work, however, by consensus and common
sense.
In order to achieve a fair balance-since this panel seems to be
representing the judiciary and the prosecution only-I should give you
an idea of what the defense's arguments are. First, they object to the
use of the word "genocide." They say it is a term coined by journalists.
In the course of our judgment we must seriously consider the term
"genocide" and decide whether one did occur in Rwanda. That is why
you will notice I use terms like "atrocities" and "massacre." The
defense also argued for equality of arms. I think that when people set
up the International Criminal Court, they should realize how expensive
that is. The defense also needs resources for its investigation and for
the involvement of experienced counsel.
The motions the defense has made involve the protection of defense
witnesses who are refugees in other countries. They wanted us to order
sovereign states to grant refugee status and not to repatriate people into
1478 [13:1469
ADJUDICATING WAR CRIMES IN R*..DA 1479
Rwanda. They argued that once these people got into Rwanda, defense
counsel would have no access to their witnesses, and that the witnesses
and their families feared threats of deaths.
The other important point is that some countries, like Belgium, have
done extensive investigations and the defense wanted disclosure of all
the Belgian files. Under our rules, we expect defense counsel to
contact and recognize their potential witnesses and be able to argue
that the detainees are going to be of value to the defense. The defense
counsel said that they cannot get into Rwanda; therefore, they do not
know what these witnesses are going to say. For example, one witness
they wanted is Karamira-whose presence was requested by defense
counsel-a leader who has been tried, convicted, and sentenced to
death inside Rwanda.
These are some of their problems. The other defense position
evolved after they called General Dallaire, the head of the United
Nations military mission inside Rwanda. He stated in his testimony
before the trial chamber that if he had 50,000 troops he might have
avoided the genocide, but he had not received the assistance that he
had requested from the United Nations. Thus, the defense's position is
that there is blood on the hands of the entire international community;
therefore, there is no reason to pick on the small guy. He only had nine
unarmed policemen. What was he expected to do?
The defense also challenged jurisdiction and competence of the
Tribunal. They challenged the application of the Geneva Conventions
in an internal conflict. They argued that there is evidence of the
participation by an entire population, making it unclear where this rule
about orders to a subordinate comes in.
The defense submission concerning the numerous prosecution
witnesses who testified about the atrocities is that there is a union,
meaning that there is a very insidious union of informers who are
coming forward and making up these stories, particularly on the
evidence on rape and sexual violence. On hearsay evidence, they have
cautioned the judges to watch out for and to be sensitive to Rwandan
culture and language, Kinyarwanda. Many of the witnesses spoke
Kinyarwanda. In response to a question I put to a linguist from
Rwanda called by the prosecution, he said that while the word for
seeing and hearing was, like in other languages, not the same,
Rwandans tended to describe events without distinguishing between
1998]
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the two. So we have to be very careful in assessing hearsay evidence.
The prosecution's case, of course, is that the acts charged were part of
a plan or strategy that consisted of genocide. I have confined myself to
these brief remarks, as the matter is sub-judice.
THE ICTR MUST ACHIEVE JUSTICE FOR
RWANDANS
PRESENTATION BY BERNARD MUNA
DEPUTY PROSECUTOR FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
INTRODUCTION
First of all, I wish to thank those who organized this conference,
because I believe it is important towards the end of this century that the
international community start to sign treaties and pass conventions that
protect human rights. Therefore, I am grateful to be able to participate
with the ongoing trials. I believe that we are making a definite
statement that humanity, collectively in the future, will not stand by
and watch when other people violate human rights. To me, that is the
real reason that I would support the International Criminal Court.
That being said, I have the privilege of participating in the trials that
are going on in the Rwanda Tribunal. I would like to start by giving
you the picture of the enormous task that lies in front of us. You have
heard that the genocide in Rwanda was five times faster than the one in
Germany, even though the German genocide had gas chambers. If you
take the lower figure of 500,000 people killed you are looking at 5,000
people a day. If you take the higher figure of one million people killed,
you are looking at 10,000 people killed a day without guillotines or gas
chambers. Instead, most of the killings were done with match heads
and spears. This meant that a large proportion of the population were
implicated for this to succeed.
This is the real drama. When Judge Pillay was giving you the
statistics of the fact that there were 120,000 people in jails, I saw some
of you shaking your head. More than 120,000 people were needed to
kill 5,000 to 10,000 people a day in all different parts of Rwanda. That
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is the real tragedy. That is the real complication for the prosecution
because you are looking at a situation in which there was a
government, army, and police. All the structures of government were
present and yet this wholesale killing took place.
The real tragedy is that with the government, police, and the army
all participating in this killing, those who died had nobody to protect
them. No government structure. No police. Yet, within the drama,
those who were close will know there were heroes. There were those
who hid their friends, those who tried to save some of them by taking
them to safe houses. By and large, it was a telling thing for human
nature when neighbor turned against neighbor. Further, there were
situations where women were asked to kill their own children.
I think as we look forward our task in the Rwanda Tribunal is to
simply hurry up. I believe that it is a very difficult task. Justice requires
time and in our case we must administer justice as justice, but
unfortunately it is often seen as a political tool. So what then do we
sacrifice? These are the tasks and the difficulties that the Office of the
Prosecutor must meet.
I. THE PROSECUTION'S INVESTIGATION
Evidently, from what I have told you, the thrust of our investigation
when I arrived had to be refocused on the conspiracy theory. The
question becomes how did this tragedy occur if there was a
government and an army in place. There must have been either a
conspiracy of silence, a conspiracy of inactivity or inaction, or a
conspiracy of participation to allow them to do the killing.
Our investigation at this stage, which is the main thrust of the policy
of the Office of the Prosecutor, is based on the fact that we have firmly
established that it was an act of conspiracy. Those who were called
upon as government officials, government departments, and police
actually turned against the people and killed them. This is the main
thrust of the Rwanda investigations.
It is important for the future to ask people what they want. In the
future, this should not happen again. The only way we can stop it is to
show why it happened. This is also a main thrust of the investigation
policy. We must be able to establish how the killing was organized and
how this tragedy was realized.
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I think for posterity and for history, we have the duty to record it.
The judges are there to bring the full story out and to sift the truth from
the untruth. But, it is the job of the prosecutor, I believe, to be able to
bring all this together and put it before the judges so that they are able
to finally decide and put in the annals of history what really happened
in Rwanda.
You have already heard about how many people we are prosecuting.
I will not go into more detail but I will give just a general observation
on our policy. I have met a lot of very well meaning people, such as
ambassadors and ministers, who come to Rwanda and express concern
about the Rwandan justice system. My answer is this: any justice
system can only administer justice according to their own means.
When I say their own means I am talking about manpower, finances,
and so on.
II. LOGISTICAL ISSUES WHEN MOUNTING A PROSECUTION
If you went into Rwanda right now and attempted to administer
justice as you would administer it here in the United States, it would be
impossible. Where would they get the money to pay for the defense
counsel, to build the jails, or to feed the prisoners? As we are judging
the Rwandan justice system, we must remember that Rwanda can only
administer justice according to the means available. For example, most
of their magistrates were killed and others left the country. Therefore,
you have a society without magistrates.
So what can Rwanda do? Send potential magistrates back to school
for three years, and then have them get four or five years of experience
while these guys are in jail? This is a drama. That is the reality. You
have 130,000 people in jail that are to be tried. What do they do?
These are the questions that we must examine before we rush to
criticize, judge, and moralize the Rwandan system. The reality is there.
Therefore, you administer justice according to your own means. It may
not be perfect, but human justice is never perfect no matter what we
may pretend or what we may think.
III. RAPE PROSECUTED AS GENOCIDE
Now, in moving forward on some of the new ground that we are
breaking we must address the use of rape charges. We have been able
to see clearly in our investigations that apart from the rape, other forms
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of sexual violence exist. Rape is actually a means of committing
genocide because when you are causing serious physical or mental
harm to members of the group, you are deliberately inflicting on them
conditions of life which are diminishing their lives. If you are
humiliating the females in a racial group, then these women in the
future cannot be expected to be mentally stabilized to bring up a
family. So, rape in itself can be a means of committing genocide. Of
course, we also see rape as torture, as a crime against humanity. These
views, however, are not reflected in the charges, which we are putting
before the court.
IV. CHALLENGES FACED BY THE ICTR
I believe that the real challenge of the Rwanda Tribunal is twofold.
First, we must administer justice. We are a court of law. Justice must
be fair and it must be done by the people. But at the same time it must
also meet with the political atmosphere in Rwanda. The people are
waiting for justice. The question is do we rush justice or do we
administer justice at the pace it requires.
As we look at the Rwandan experience, I think that one of the
lessons we must learn is that a court cannot be a bureaucratic
organization. One of the things our court system is presently suffering
from is that it has a very strong umbilical cord tied to one of the
biggest bureaucrats in the world, the United Nations system. This
means that those who are setting the guidelines are always thinking
bureaucratically. If we are to create a new court, we must look at it as a
court of law with professionals, people who know what law is about
and not just bureaucracy. These are the people who know that a court
is to administer justice. These are the people who know what the
system is all about. To me, this is the first thing we have to do when
we establish a court.
Second, we must reexamine the purpose of this court. If the court is
going to administer justice, then we must give it the manpower, and
thus the capability of administering justice.
We have come under a lot of criticism as being slow, and
comparisons have been made to the Nuremberg trials. Yet people
forget that in the Nuremberg trial the Department of the Prosecutor had
about 2,000 or more people. Additionally, it was a military court and
not a civilian court with 180 eyes of the United Nations looking at us
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with different interests. Therefore, we are under a different pressure of
reestablishing a civil court. In essence, we must go very carefully and
make sure that we are planting a firm foundation for the future and
hope that if we succeed then the new international court can be
successful.
CONCLUSION
I would like to wind up by saying that one of the tragedies in
Rwanda is that there is still conflict. In the time that we are taking to
go to court, there is still fighting in the northwest part of the country
near the border between Zaire and Rwanda. As we speak here today,
there are still people who believe that the war must continue. Unless
that country can increase its security, a judge might adjudicate fifty or
even one hundred cases. That, however, will not solve the problem of
Rwanda.
Rwanda's problems will finally be solved when justice is done,
when the people are satisfied that justice was done, and when all of
humanity accepts that we must live together as a community. We must
allow everybody to live his own life within that society without
interference or threat from another person. To me, this is the challenge.
A court will come and go, but the real challenge for the international
community is whether we will be able to make that point and make it
clear. Everyone must understand that when people are being killed
because they belong to a political party or to a religious group, this
court means business. The international community must not only
insist that these cases go before a judge, but they must act beforehand
to see that there is prevention.
PRESENTATION BY THE HONORABLE
THEOGENE RUDASINGWA
AMBASSADOR OF RWANDA TO THE UNITED STATES
INTRODUCTION
AMBASSADOR RUDASINGWA: First of all, I must confess that I am in
a very unfamiliar terrain because most of you here are legal experts
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and I am definitely not a legal expert. Second, most of you are
academicians, and I do not think that I qualify to be called an
academician.
Please bear with me if my comments fall below your expectations
and if my comments tend to be on the political side. Having said this, I
definitely am pleased to be in your meeting and to share with you
some of the experiences that people in Rwanda have had in the recent
past, particularly during 1994.
I was asked to shed light on four issues. First, the government
program of national prosecutions. Second, the goals of the government
relating to this issue of justice. Third, how the ICTR coordinates with
the national judiciary. Lastly, how the ICTR may contribute to the
overall process of justice in Rwanda.
I. RWANDA'S PROGRAM OF NATIONAL PROSECUTIONS
A. Member States of the United Nations Failed to Intervene Against
Rwandan Genocide
Whenever we talk about the failures or shortcomings of some of
these international efforts, I think it is important that we come to speak
about the failures of the Member States that constitute the United
Nations. Sometimes people talk about the failures of the United
Nations as if the United Nations is some kind of abstract organization.
The Member States are fond of hiding behind that screen. When we
talk about the weaknesses, it is imperative that you also think about the
weaknesses of the individual Member States that constitute the United
Nations.
The failure of the United Nations back in 1994 was more or less a
failure of the Member States. About a week ago we learned that no one
other than the President of the United States himself came to Rwanda
to acknowledge that, yes, the United Nations failed. But it was also the
Member States, including the powerful nations of this world, who
failed in preventing and stopping the genocide. They failed to look at
the legacy of the genocide and some of the problems we have come to
witness in Rwanda. This includes the problems with security, which
Bernard Muna just mentioned.
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B. Rwandan Prosecution Program Holds All Genocide Perpetrators
Accountable
The government program of national prosecution proceeds from
their own genocide. This law simply proceeds from the premise that
everyone who committed genocide would be made individually
accountable for the crime that he or she committed. Of course, there
were many offenses committed during this period, and I think Bernard
Muna has shown the drama of the crime that was committed. We have
so many other programs to think about that spending a lot of time
trying to prosecute some of these minor offenses, which of course in
some situations might be very major offenses, is difficult.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion Codified in Rwandan Law
Second, the government recognizes that the existing system of
administration of justice may not be able to prosecute all that should be
prosecuted. That is why the law on genocide in Rwanda attempted to
categorize offenses. I think it was a political act on the part of those
who are trying to deal with this seemingly complex situation; an
attempt to deal with a high degree of participation of the population in
this kind of crime. It was Neil Kritz and his colleagues from the United
States who shed some light on this question during a 1995 conference
on genocide.
D. Punishment Under Rwandan Program
Third, the government recognizes that everybody found guilty can
not be punished in the way that we may want. This means that the
death penalty is limited only to Category I type offenses. These are the
people who were the masterminds of the genocide. For the others, of
course, we are thinking about extended sentences or some other forms
of punishment.
II. RWANDA'S RESPONSE TO ENORMOUS CASELOAD
We have also considered other innovative ideas for dealing with this
heavy caseload. For example, conducting investigations sector by
sector. This entails moving across the country, looking at every sector
within the country, and carrying out investigations at this smaller level.
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We have also considered conducting group trials. I am sure you have
probably heard of this kind of trial elsewhere. In doing so, we would
separate Category I type suspects from the rest of the suspects who
might wish to benefit from them. In addition, we thought about finding
a group to help us deal with the issue of legal assistance to the
suspects. That in itself would be a contributing factor to ultimately
expediting the massive caseload of people that we have in the prisons.
III. RWANDA FACES A HISTORY OF IMPUNITY
The basic goal of the government is to deal with the culture of
impunity that has characterized post-independence Rwanda. Formal
political independence was obtained in 1962. But even before then, the
governments in place were characterized by a high level of impunity.
The first holocaust in Rwanda took place in 1959 under the auspices of
the existing administration. From 1962 onwards, the post-independ-
ence history of Rwanda is an endless story of holocaust and killings,
culminating in the genocide of 1994. The genocide of 1994 was not an
isolated incident, nor was it an accident.
We are clearly dealing with this historical legacy of impunity. Part
of the strategy for dealing with the question of genocide is for the
country, government, and the people of Rwanda to deal with this
culture of impunity. I will comment later on why the question of the
rule of law becomes imperative in dealing with the future of Rwanda.
Furthermore, we must dispense justice in a way that also helps us to
stabilize society. It must help bridge gaps within our society, help
reconciliation, and try to unite the Rwandan people. The diversity of
politics in Rwanda largely contributed to what happened in 1994. As
we try to elaborate on the law of genocide, we must ask: How do you
dispense justice in such a way that at the end of the day, you help
society to begin to live? We cannot spend our time and future
generation's time trying to deal with the problems of administering
justice alone.
Dispensing justice is a problem that has dimensions that are not
entirely legal. Indeed there are political, social, and cultural dimensions
as well. The bottom line here is: Yes, there has to be justice, but justice
must be dispensed in such a way that it will promote reconciliation and
development within the country.
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IV. RWANDA'S RESPONSE TO THE ICTR
I would also like to address the relationship between the national
prosecutions and the work of the ICTR. The ICTR and the Rwandan
Government appear to have a strained relationship. It was mentioned
that we had the lone dissenting voice in the United Nations Security
Council when the ICTR was being established. While we did have
concerns when the ICTR was established, we still showed our support.
Part of the problem we had with the ICTR in the past was that it was
an institution of the United Nations and institutions of the United
Nations quite often act inefficiently for us. We had very special
circumstances in our country that we were trying to deal with and quite
often we became impatient with the way the ICTR was conducting its
business. But, we did not hide our sentiments. Those who have dealt
with the Rwandan Government probably know that this is one of our
trademarks. We are very frank; when we disagree, we disagree in the
open. Since then, I should say there has been some degree of progress,
probably attributable to the awakening within the system itself, but
more so to the new blood that has been infused into the process.
Yet, there is still much that has to be done. First, we should get in
the habit of thinking about the ICTR and the Rwandan process as
complementary rather than competing. I think we have the same
objectives and the same goals. Second, we feel that if there is any
assistance that the Rwandan process can provide to the International
Criminal Tribunal, it should not be withheld. Third, we believe that
this kind of cooperation should be based on an agreement. I think there
should be a formal agreement between the ICTR and the Rwandan
Government on how this cooperation should proceed. Finally, I believe
that the question of contribution by the ICTR to Rwanda is a subject
that should be left to further discussion. But, I think that the sky is the
limit as to what the contributions should be. The ICTR knows very
well the situation that exists in Rwanda. There should not be any
restriction in terms of what help they can give.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let me mention two things that quite often escape
mention. One is the plight of the survivors of genocide in Rwanda. We
all believe that ultimately justice will be done when there is
reconciliation. One category of people that is forgotten, however, is the
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survivors of genocide. We have been trying to put this item on the
agenda. It has been difficult, however, because the governmental
organizations and the international agencies who deal best with
refugees tend to act on the kind of things that attract the attention of
many people across the world. This category of people, the Rwandan
survivors, has been forgotten. If you are not doing anything for this
category of people, the survivors of genocide, I am afraid you cannot
talk about reconciliation.
The other issue is one of security. How does security relate to justice
in Rwanda today? Why does this insecurity exist in the north? What is
the problem in the northern part of the country'? First of all, the
problem in the north is the continuation of what happened in 1994.
These people, the perpetrators of genocide, seem to think they have an
unfinished job and they are very eager to complete that job. If you
trace the problem from the exit of people to the return of refugees back
into Rwanda at the end of 1996, you will see that we allowed people to
go back to their communes without checking. This is because we are
not able to check. We are very eager to resolve the problem of
refugees.
AUDIENCE QUESTIONS
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Ambassador Rudasingwa, you know the
United States has announced a justice initiative for the Great Lakes,
obviously much of that focusing on Rwanda. What do you want to see
come out of that? What precisely do you think the Rwandan
Government needs to handle some of these 120,000 some cases?
AMBASSADOR RUDASINGWA: The Great Lakes justice initiative is an
initiative that applies to other countries in that region, but I think
Rwanda probably qualifies more than any. I also think that there is
more focus on Rwanda right now.
We have been talking with the government of the United States to
focus on the question of human resources development. For example,
if you look at what is happening in the justice system in Rwanda there
are just over one hundred prosecutors in the country and most of these
prosecutors are high school graduates. These are not prosecutors
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dealing with an ordinary case; these are prosecutors dealing with a
complicated case of genocide.
There are a few university students in the national university who
will be graduating shortly. But that shows you the gravity of the
situation. Further, there are probably only about sixty private lawyers
in the entire country. The situation is indeed very grave and whether
they are talking about judges, prosecutors, or investigators, I think
Rwanda has suffered.
One area of concern is how the United States government can help
provide the training and develop the kind of resources that we need to
deal with this sort of problem. A second area of concern is the issue of
the fund for the survivors of genocide. We are very glad that President
Clinton announced the $2 million contribution to the survivors of
genocide fund. Third, we must see what can be done in the area of
training. Our experts in this field are very limited. The most input
came from Neil Kritz and the others. I think they still have an
obligation to help us try to elaborate what could be done because it is
through this process that we can reduce the kind of caseload that we
have.
I was reading statistics and was told that at the current pace with
which we are moving it probably would take the next 400 years to try
the 120,000 people that we have in the prisons. It is in that context that
I want to make a direct appeal to American University, particularly its
law school, the Washington College of Law. This law school should
participate in an effort to see how we can deal with the problem of
genocide. More specifically, we are spending a lot of time thinking
about genocide because it is the absence of a justice system in the first
instance that led to genocide. We need also to spend some of our time
looking at how we can establish a rule of law in Rwanda, and how we
can establish a justice system in the country.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am Jason Abrams, with the United Nations
Office of Legal Affairs. I think Ambassador Rudasingwa has already
made some observations on this issue, but I would appreciate the
observations of Judge Navanethem Pillay and Mr. Muna as to the
extent to which and how the Tribunal has made an impact on the
rehabilitation of the domestic judicial system in Rwanda.
Are you finding that your work is fertilizing in any way the process
of rebuilding the justice system in that country? For example, are
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Rwandan judicial officers or officials coming to Arusha to watch your
proceedings? Are there formal contacts between Tribunal officials and
judicial officials in Rwanda? Thank you.
MR. KRrrz: I am going to take the liberty of actually adding to that.
Are there any prospects for the Tribunal actually conducting some of
its proceedings in Rwanda and interacting with the system?
JuDGE PILLAY: Our rules provide that we can hold trials outside the
seat of the court as stipulated by the statute if reason arises. I do not
know what the practical possibilities are of holding a trial in Rwanda.
When there was a defense application for the transfer of a convicted
prisoner facing execution, the suggestion from the bench to the defense
was that you always have the chance of applying for his evidence to be
taken on commissions. That is about the closest our proceedings have
come to being held in Rwanda.
There has been a great deal of cooperation between the Government
of Rwanda and the Tribunal and we have had some very important
visitors. For example, we had their chief prosecutor with us last week.
The Rwandan Ambassador in Tanzania also visited us. She said that
she now understands, after observing the trial, what kind of trial
procedures and rules the Tribunal adopted. Previously, the Rwandan
authorities were highly critical about the slow pace. There is that level
of cooperation. The judges first took the position that it is not for the
judges to be approaching the governments. We wanted to perform our
functions in the way that we were expected to; but we found that
because of the tensions between the government and the Tribunal
coupled with the lack of cooperation, we had some difficulty. Despite
this difficulty, we actually had some very good meetings with the
Rwandan Government.
MR. MUNA: I would just like to cite a note of caution because it is
not the fact that all the criminals in Rwanda who committed genocide
will be tried and that will bring about reconciliation. That is not going
to bring reconciliation. When we talk about reconciliation, it is our
hope that, as time goes on, the wounds will heal as a result of the
development of a justice system.
The problem is where do you start? Where do you start with
somebody who has lost six or all members of his family? It is a very
difficult process and it will take a long time. Just three or four years
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ago, when they were celebrating the fiftieth anniversary and the end of
the Second World War, the French and the British refused to let their
current allies, the Germans, come to Paris or to London. If we think as
a human society-ensuring that we understand both sides-that is the
way neighboring countries can understand what happened and come to
heal.
The second point, of course, is the building of the Rwandan justice
system. We did have and we do have some of the lawyers from the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court going to Rwanda and sitting
in on the trials. They were very impressed and they understand the
situation better now.
Lastly, of course, there is cooperation now with the OTP. It has
opened up to us and we are able to go and talk to them. We talk to all
the magistrates of the different communes and cooperate in
investigations. As we cooperate, they are able to understand how we
work. We hope they will also see how they investigate their cases and
put together their files. But, the international court cannot be a
substitute for their own system. We can only hope that there will be
some cross influences.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I would like to ask one question. I am a
student. I just wanted to ask the Ambassador what he really thinks is
the likelihood of reconciliation and what the role of Africa is as a
whole. Rwanda is always seeking help from the North. What do you
think the role of the South is? Further, is there anything the South can
contribute to bring reconciliation and prevent future conflicts? Is there
anything to be learned from what happened in Rwanda in 1994?
AMBASSADOR RUDASINGWA: Is reconciliation possible in Rwanda?
I think so. First of all, you need to recognize that the Rwandan people
have lived together for so many centuries, and that the problems of
division and genocide are indeed more than a phenomenon. The post-
independence regimes in Rwanda acted irresponsibly by dragging the
whole society into this crime of genocide.
However, in order for reconciliation to take place, we have to invest
in it. This is going to be a long and difficult process. Part of the
investment that we have to make is trying to establish institutions that
can help the people of Rwanda have the last line of defense against the
governments. The process of institutional building becomes very
critical, and how we are addressing the political question is very
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important. Additionally, how we generate resources and how we
distribute resources within the country are indeed programs that are
very much related to the problem of justice under reconciliation. I
think those items are important things that we have to invest in to
ensure that it never happens again.
I truly hope that the Africans have learned from the Rwandan
experience. I wish there were more Africans in this audience to listen
to what is taking place. I would also have liked to see more of my
fellow African ambassadors in the audience. In a number of African
countries, I must confess, there are certain situations that do exist,
which if we are not very vigilant, might easily generate into the kind of
situation that we lived through tragically in 1994.
Genocide or war crimes are not an inherently African phenomenon.
I think the last one hundred years have shown that these are things that
human beings, when they decide to be as vicious as we have seen, can
do anywhere. It is very important that the African people learn from
the experience of Rwanda so that it never happens again on the African
continent and, moreover, never happens again in the world.
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